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 “And, while he accumulates material wealth in his isolation, he thinks 
with satisfaction how mighty and secure he has become, because he is mad and 
cannot see that the more goods he accumulates, the deeper he sinks into suicidal 
impotence. The reason for this is that he has become accustomed to relying only 
on himself; he has split off from the whole and become an isolated unit; he has 
trained his soul not to rely on human help, not to believe in men and mankind, and 
only to worry that the wealth and privileges he has accumulated may get lost. 
Everywhere men today are turning scornfully away from the truth that the security 
of the individual cannot be achieved by his isolated efforts but only by mankind 
as a whole.”    Dostoyevsky  The Brothers Karamazov 
 
 
Introduction 
 On the very first day of the 1990s, a modern miracle occurred: a politician spoke the 
truth! Granted, the speaker was someone who less than two months previously had been a 
repressed dissident, a playwright and ex-prisoner. But in those remarkable events in which the 
iron curtain fell at the very end of the 1980s, Vaclav Havel suddenly found himself to be the 
President of Czechoslovakia. And in his New Year’s address to the nation, he uttered the 
unspeakable: he told Czechs how bad things really were for them as the nation faced the new 
decade. Not only did he speak the obvious truth which everyone knew, but which had never been 
spoken with public sanction before: “The previous regime, armed with a proud and intolerant 
ideology, reduced people into the means of production...out of talented and responsible people, 
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ingeniously husbanding their land, it made cogs of some great, monstrous, thudding, smelly 
machine, with an unclear purpose. All it can do is, slowly but irresistibly, wear itself out, with all 
its cogs.” Though powerfully expressed, these words only made public what everyone already 
believed. 
 The deeper truth that Havel told was that of the spoiled moral environment, which had 
been brought about not just by the communist overlords, but by “all of us.” All politicians know 
how to point the finger elsewhere, but Havel insisted that the problem could only be addressed 
by also pointing the finger at “us” and at oneself:  
“The worst of it is that we live in a spoiled moral environment. We have 
become morally ill because we are used to saying one thing and thinking another. We 
have learned not to believe in anything, not to care about each other, to worry only about 
ourselves. The concepts of love, friendship, mercy, humility or forgiveness have lost their 
depths and dimension, and for many of us they represent only some sort of psychological 
curiosity or they appear as long-lost wanderers from faraway times, somewhat ludicrous 
in the era of computers and spaceships...” Vaclav Havel, New Year’s Day Presidential 
Address, Prague, Jan. 1, 1990.  
 Havel’s words ring with clarity for Eastern Europe, but they also describe only too well 
the calamity of American materialism and its spoiled moral environment. In the 1980s 
Americans faced new problems of homelessness, as increasing numbers of poor people, 
including whole families and even employed workers, found that they could no longer pay the 
rent. While financial institutions soared and free-market economists praised the system, ever 
larger numbers of Americans were forced to give up what homes they had, to trade in domestic 
warmth for what public shelter they could find. That the most powerful nation in the world could 
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virtually ignore the problem at the federal level while wasting billions of dollars in inefficient or 
corrupt military procurements speaks of the spoiling of the American moral environment. But a 
far more insidious, if less obvious, homelessness was also underway throughout households and 
communities, a phenomenon which could be called moral homelessness. 
 A Gallop pole, published on the same day that Havel gave his speech, reported that about 
three-quarters of American adults expected their personal and family lives to become better by 
the year 2000, and to have better financial security and job situations. Almost as many (68%) 
anticipated more leisure and recreation time. From the point of view of “us,” the millennium 
looks bright to most Americans. Yet when the question shifts from “us” to “them,” the majority 
of Americans who anticipate better family lives (77%) also anticipates a worsening of the 
divorce rate (58%), unemployment (59%), and alcohol and drug abuse (58%).1 
 One wonders how it is that 89% of Americans can think it will become more difficult for 
parents to afford colleges for their children, and harder for people to buy a house (81%), and to 
afford retirement and medical care (both 79%), if the personal and family prospect is so bright. 
Could it be that Americans are used to saying one thing and thinking another?  Or the worse 
problem of saying and thinking one thing while denying the other?  
 According to a 1975 Roper organization survey, 69% of Americans thought that “a job 
that is interesting” contributed an essential ingredient to the good life, whereas 45% checked off 
“a job that pays much more than average.” By 1989 both percentages had equalized to 61%—a 
full 15% more Americans believed that receiving paychecks that are “much more than average” 
should be a significant ingredient in the good life, while 8% less than in 1975 thought the job 
itself should be a significant ingredient. Similar increases among college students in the 
valuation of “making more money” as the chief goal of college education were also reported in 
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other studies. Money became an even more significant symbol of the American way of life in the 
1980s. It was not simply the utilitarian purchasing power of money which was idealized, but the 
symbolic power of money to produce status. 
 These and numerous other figures confirm the resurgence of what Thorstein Veblen, 
writing at the height of “The Gilded Age” at the turn-of-the-century, called “pecuniary 
emulation” and “invidious comparison”: living according to external, abstract status markers. 
Moving toward the top of the heap is what matters, not what you are or even what you have but 
simply having “much more than the average.”  
 Further confirmation of the “top of the heap” syndrome can be seen in the great social 
structural “taffy pull” of the 1980s, in which a portion of the middle class moved upwards in 
socio-economic status, while a larger chunk was downwardly mobile.  The American class 
system was pulled further apart, with the rich getting richer, the poor getting poorer, and the 
middle class thinning out. Americans supported a massive increase in the “social welfare” of the 
military-industrial complex, with enormous amounts of money being poured into the military 
bureaucracy while monies were simultaneously drained from those programs designed to aid the 
poor. The interest alone on the increased military spending soon outweighed the money “saved” 
from decimating social welfare programs. It was a good decade to be on the dole if you were a 
military cog. 
 This reshaping of the American class system in the last decade, which all the while was 
being celebrated as illustrating the success of “free-market democracy,” can be viewed as the 
new phase of an antidemocratic system constituted by a small ruling and bureaucratic elite and a 
growing permanent underclass. Yet the values of materialistic consumerism did not seem to be 
confined to any one class. It is hard to see how a democracy can endure under such conditions, in 
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which rich and poor alike in America are smitten with the lure of money, and in which the 
pursuit of such values further exacerbates class cleavages. 
 Yuppies symbolized the decade of “upward bound,” a decade in which Wall Street 
investment gambling was idolized. State governments encouraged the get-rich-quick mentality 
through lotteries which attracted the money of the poor, while simultaneously condemning the 
get-rich-quick mentality of drug dealers. And at the top of the American heap stood Mickey 
Mouse: by the end of the ‘80s, the two highest salaries in America were made by Walt Disney 
executives—the higher of the two making what amounted to almost the upper limit of the annual 
household poverty income level every hour. Money, it seems, is the stuff of which the American 
dream is made. 
 This was, after all, the nation that never lost confidence in Ronald Reagan the man, even 
when it occasionally thought his policies had gone astray. Reagan the President may have sold 
the nation a bill of goods in the 1980s—socialism for the wealthy, the military and the 
governmental profiteers, capitalism for the poor, and a legacy of massive governmental theft and 
corruption—but Reagan the man was a smiling celebrity who said to feel good. And so 
Americans entered the 1990s feeling good, even if, to twist Havel’s words a bit: “The previous 
regime, armed with a proud and intolerant ideology, reduced people into the means of 
consumption, and nature into its tools...Out of talented and responsible people...it made cogs of 
some sort of great, monstrous, thudding, smelly machine, with an unclear purpose.”  
The Great American Centrifuge 
 In the 1980s, many American cities and towns have witnessed continued erosion of 
downtown vitality through centrifugal tendencies which have dislocated the city in favor of what 
Lewis Mumford aptly called “urbanoid tissue,” such as suburban shopping malls, or through the 
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further dispersion of industry and suburbs. Malls are not new, but mall culture became solidly 
institutionalized, so that by 1987 the over 30,000 shopping centers in the U.S. generated $586 
billion in sales, or 13 percent of the gross national product, while employing almost 9 million 
people, or 8 percent of the U.S. labor force.2 Yet malls are not only significant as major focal 
points of financial investment and development, but as a new way of life. Similarly, the 
increasing colonization of the home by high-technology throughout the 80s may also represent a 
continuing threat to the “centering” of family meaning.  
 By focusing on the effects of commercialism on home and city life, I wish to confront the 
problems posed by American “centrifugal” consumer culture: is it still possible to preserve 
human autonomy in the face of a culture which consumes personal time and energy through a 
plethora of “consuming devices,” or has the distraction industry finally triumphed? Do the 
patterns of meaning in the contemporary American home represent a continuation of traditional 
themes in new, high-tech clothing, or a basic transformation of values?  Do the neighborhood 
and city remain as vital sources of community life or have they been devitalized by new 
residential patterns—by “urbanoid tissue?”  Why does the contemporary American seem to be 
the helpless victim of kitsch consumerism, as portrayed every single day and night on 
commercial television and acted out in the patterns of everyday life? 
 The 1980s marked a dramatic upsurge in materialism in America, coupled, ironically, 
with a nostalgia for the uncomplicated, unmaterialistic “good old days” of “family values.”  The 
increased materialism—by which I mean here consumerism and profiteerism, although I will 
return later to the possibilities of a more positive version of materialism—in the 1980s continued 
already well-institutionalized patterns of consumption, but also signaled a new phase in the 
incursion of the great Mammon machine into private and public life. 
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 Electronic innovations, such as microwave ovens, compact disks, video cassette 
recorders, and cable television reached into the home. Indeed the 1980s continued and perhaps 
even speeded up a long process of the transformation of luxuries into perceived necessities. Just 
as indoor toilets and refrigerators, both originally introduced as luxury goods, became standard 
necessities in American homes by the mid-twentieth century, to be followed by televisions, the 
1980s saw increasing amounts of luxury items—such as microwaves and video cassette 
recorders—being considered as “necessities.” Somewhat older forms, such as fast-food joints 
and shopping malls, absorbed greater numbers of consumers and Americans spent more time in 
their automobiles to reach these places.3 In fact, the ‘80s began with the prospect that the home 
office, through the personal computer, would achieve a far greater role in the “workplace,” and 
ended with the automobile—that master symbol of American culture—as the model office of the 
future. Through the cellular phone, the fax machine, and the computer, the auto is in the process 
of becoming the ideal high-tech, travelling office in the age of gridlock, as ever-increasing 
amounts of congested roadways reduce mobility to and from work. Taken together, all of these 
developments signaled an ever greater reliance on automatic, technical culture.  
 The term “auto” means self—hence “automobile” or self-moving—but the meanings of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s essay “Self-Reliance” and contemporary “auto reliance” could not be 
more disparate. Consider the irony of business people sitting in stalled traffic, diligently working 
with all the conveniences of home and office: the auto-immobile.  
 Perhaps it would have been better if another term, originally applied to one of the earliest 
self-moving vehicles, had been adopted, the “locomobile.” Given the increasing amounts of time 
Americans are spending in these “moving places,” and given the effects cars have had in 
dominating and devitalizing cities through residential sprawl, workday congestion, and the sheer 
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roadways themselves, and given the continuing subordination of organic human purpose and 
habitat to the requirements of the delocalizing, centralized machine mentality, the term 
“locomobile” also captures the “moving craziness” of contemporary American culture.   
 American culture today highlights the modern battle between autonomy and the 
automaton. The great dream of the modern era has been to provide for and enlarge the autonomy 
of humankind through technical invention and control over the necessities of life. As that dream 
has been realized it has all too frequently revealed itself in diabolical reversal. The vast technical 
culture and wealth of America have not led the way toward the good life, but instead toward the 
goods life, toward a reified culture centered in commodities rather than citizens, toward an 
ultimate goal of automatic things and away from human autonomy. This is not the necessary 
outcome of the development of technology, but the consequence of the withering of human 
purpose in the face of the “magic” of technique.  
 As part of the larger dynamics of the modern era, American culture has transformed 
technique from a means to the good life to a virtual goal unto itself, with the result that 
Americans have increasingly seemed to be willing to sacrifice the art and practice and struggles 
of concrete life to the conveniences of abstract technique: to give up the active cultivation of 
home life to the passive consumption of TV and TV dinners, to give up multipurpose centers for 
civic life and local commerce to self-enclosed, privatized, behavior monitoring shopping malls, 
to surrender the pursuit of qualitative autonomy to the pursuit of dollars. Yet the high crime and 
divorce statistics, the addiction rates, the escalating political hypocrisy, the easygoing ignorance 
of those cultural values which are not conveniently transmitted by the media, and the widespread 
disparagement of serious, non-commercial, non-sporting activities, all testify to a culture in 
decline, not to a culture realizing enriched and rewarding lives.  
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 The changes of the 1980s brought to new levels the centrifugal tendencies of American 
culture. By this I mean to say that contemporary American culture can be characterized as 
diverting energies outward, ever outward, and as decentering personal, domestic, and public life 
in the interests of a great, centralized, hedo-mechanistic system. That system has been criticized 
as capitalism, in which, in Marx’s apt phrase, “all that is solid melts into air.” Clearly many of 
the dynamics of capitalism, such as the idea of unlimited competition, work against democratic 
values, despite the benumbed belief by many Americans that capitalism and democracy are 
synonyms. Yet capitalism per se does not alone characterize the system, since the communist 
countries of the twentieth-century have also possessed similar centrifugal tendencies, displacing 
human qualities from private and public life for the cause of a great military-bureaucratic 
production machine, as Havel’s words so lucidly express. Hence it is important to view 
American culture within the dynamics of modern culture, while recognizing its own peculiarities.  
The American hedo-mechanistic system can also be seen as a variety of modern 
rationalistic bureaucracy, functioning, in Max Weber’s words, like a “steel-hard casing” or “iron 
cage;” and as an avatar of what Lewis Mumford has termed “the megamachine” or “pentagon of 
power.” These terms are meant to describe the dynamics of modern culture, and are not limited 
to America, though all of them help to describe the hegemony of “Americanism” in the late 
twentieth-century.  
 What I wish to claim in the limited confines of this paper is simply that the dominant 
values in contemporary American life express a fragmenting and exteriorized culture, which 
works to enhance power, prestige, and profit, while devastating the inner resources of the person, 
the relations of the domestic sphere, and the possibilities for a public life.  
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 The terms centrifugal and centripetal are usually associated with Sir Isaac Newton, who 
used them respectively to denote physical movement away from or toward a center. 
“Centrifugal” derives from the Latin verb fugere, to flee, and though Newton may have 
transformed the literal root to a metaphoric mechanical meaning, I would like to keep the literal 
sense in mind as well: that in the patterns of American consumer culture one sees a fleeing from 
the challenges of autonomy and a gravitating toward the automatic and the automaton. The 
objective indicators of meaning suggest selves pulled outward by the forces of commodities, 
away from the practical requirements of subjective cultivation, families too busy to be together 
or too fragile to stay together, cities corroded by the flight of people, money, and things to the 
periphery.  
 There is another term from physics which is relevant here. As Owen Barfield points out, 
Kepler seems to have been the first to use the ancient Latin term “focus” in its now commonly 
accepted sense “as the quasi-center of a geometrical figure—the focus of an ellipse—and it is 
thought that, in doing so, he had in mind that point in a lens or parabolic mirror, at which the 
sun’s rays are concentrated, so that it becomes a burning glass.” “Focus” originally was the word 
for hearth, and maintained this limited meaning until Kepler transformed it into a technical term 
of mechanics. In saying that contemporary American culture can be characterized as centrifugal, 
I mean to say that it has lost its focus, in the literal sense of a hearth, a warm emotional and even 
physical center at the heart of the household and everyday life.  
Consuming Devices 
 America is supposed to be a land possessed of “labor saving” devices, but “possessed by” 
might better describe the situation. Consider automobiles, for which there are almost one for 
every adult. The average American woman spends 9 hours per week in the automobile, to the 
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average man’s 11 hours, with the two hours difference due to extra commuting time for men. A 
recent survey found that Americans are spending more time commuting to work than a decade 
ago, and the widespread problems of gridlock are well known. As this labor saving device has 
become increasingly central to everyday life—80% of all travel in America, defined broadly as 
simply moving from one location to another, is by car—it has created environments which 
increase the time spent in autos and the average percentage of household money spent in 
transportation.4 One only need look at the lack of sidewalks in many suburbs and shopping mall 
entrances to see the effects of “walking deprivation culture” and the virtual dictatorship of the 
auto. 
 Similarly, microwave ovens and fast food restaurants reduce the amount of time one 
needs to spend cooking, but ultimately the question of “convenience” needs to confront the 
practice of everyday life. A colleague of mine and his wife keep an ironic diary of “time saved” 
with their microwave oven, add it up at the end of the year, and “give” it to themselves as an 
absurd holiday. Their humorous example points to the seldom acknowledged problem: is 
liberation from the practice of everyday living a form of autonomy or a form of alienation? 
Obviously both outcomes are possible, but I would like to claim that the overall trend has been 
toward an abstraction from the arts and crafts of everyday life.  
 Perhaps the ideal future of the American home can still be seen in Woody Allen’s 1971 
movie Sleeper, where domestic robots and machines control every aspect of the home, allowing 
the residents to spend their time in orgies, idly ignoring the bureaucratic police state while in the 
blissful pursuit of orgasms. Sleeper does for the home what Charlie Chaplin’s worker in Modern 
Times did for the factory—it lampoons the tyranny of the machine in modern life. 
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 The presumed purpose of the high-tech household in America is to transfer everyday 
necessities—heating, cooking, cleaning, and so forth—to machines, in order to enlarge “leisure 
time.” Yet leisure is itself largely a machine activity in America. Consider that the average 
American spent 3,000 hours consuming media in 1988, of which 1,550 hours were devoted to 
television, and 1160 to radio. The average American household has a television on for 11 hours 
per day. These numbing numbers suggest that Americans devote an enormous amount of time to 
the daily habit of listening and watching. Americans seemed to enter the 1980s as “joggers” and 
to exit as quasi-stationary “couch potatoes.” Perhaps the great tendency to sit—in autos and in 
front of televisions—was perhaps offset somewhat by a reported rise in the “standing breakfast,” 
eaten next to a kitchen counter, or by stand-up eating  in fast food restaurants. But these standing 
and sitting patterns only testify to overly mechanized life. 
 If one takes random spins of the TV dial, it becomes quickly clear that American 
television is virtually one continuous showing of what could be titled “Rehearsals in Violence” 
(though I do not mean to belittle the nearly continuous adventures in sexual innuendo and 
commodity fetishism). The spread of cable TV has not so much changed the pattern, as merely 
increased the amount broadcast. To my way of thinking, Americans are willing prisoners of 
insensate violence and a hypocritical lasciviousness, which, while suggesting outrageous sexual 
activity, never shows the human body and virtually never shows unproblematic conjugal sex. 
The violence and ersatz titillation of television alone make it an ideal video-opiate of the people. 
But when one factors in the bombardment of commercials which pluck every heartstring, and 
news media which fasten on every human tragedy for which images can be conveyed, and raise 
criminal activity to the status of evening entertainment, it is clear that the images projected by 
American culture have assumed the appearance of a vast, collective, carnival geek show.  
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 The problems of TV are not simply those of “image” assuming a commanding power, but 
of the fundamental demoralization of life in the late 20th century. Media critics frequently 
suggest that we need to become more critical toward advertising images, which is true enough. 
But the images are themselves carefully encoded moral messages, signs designed to seize the 
attention on a habitual basis and filled with the “morality” of instant gratification. The same state 
governments which tell impoverished ghetto dwellers not to use crack cocaine as an instant “fix” 
for life’s problems will tell them to spend their money on the state lottery to get rich quick, and 
then justify these schemes as a means of bringing in revenues to help the poor. How can the eye 
turn coldly away from the image of a baby, even if that baby is being used to sell a carpet 
cleaner? The images of advertising, which invade the home and pervade the public environment, 
are key participants in the demoralization of American life, with their never-ending epiphany that 
the best things in life are those qualities, commodities, and intangible human relationships which 
can be bought and sold.  
 Even more fundamentally than learning to be critical of commercials, we need to learn 
how to be at home with ourselves and our lives, how to carve out patterns of private conduct that 
preserve the autonomy of subjective life, of intimacy and family life. We need to “walk around 
ourselves” as Dostoevsky’s Father Zosima from The Brothers Karamazov puts it, on an everyday 
basis, cultivating habits of conduct which encourage feelingful relationships, honest self-
examination, and purposeful self-discipline in the home. What would happen if one day 
Americans were to turn off the televisions and radios, to reflect on the silence, to work at de-
automating private life?  
 The home does and should provide respite from the world, but in this Age of the 
Automaton, the incursions of the technical world have long since reached the home’s hearth, 
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replacing that focus of domestic life and family feelings with sterile images of life as situation 
comedy—”family ties”—or as an endless series of violent sexual innuendo, manned by suave 
secret police and accompanied by pseudo-Dionysic rock and roll. Is it any wonder that the 
American populace was too benumbed to care that the secret police were dominating American 
foreign policy during the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s, instead, actually elevating the secret 
policeman Oliver North into a hero? Or that the supposed President of the American people 
spent an inordinate amount of time in front of the television during his eight years in office, 
allowing his subordinates to privatize the public realm to their own self-interests?  In the 
American morality play of the ‘80s, Americans gladly traded Hollywood fantasies of enormous 
wealth and success for reality—symbolized as much by Ronald Reagan as by the “Dallas” and 
“Dynasty” soap operas and the tele-evangelists who preached conservative morality while 
practicing libertine corruption. 
Home Cooking 
 Until recently, one could loosely accept as a broad definition of what constitutes a family 
in America, “those household members gathered around the evening meal.” This definition could 
include the traditional extended family, such as an uncle who rented a room in the attic, and, 
given the changing ideas of what constitutes a family today, could include non-traditional 
arrangements, such as unmarried couples, gay couples, and renters. Even pets might qualify. Yet 
such a simple and seemingly encompassing definition has become obsolete today, because the 
evening meal at home has fractured apart. 
 The pull away from “home” as a social ensemble was reported in a recent Gallop poll of 
November, 1989, which revealed that almost 40% of those who dine at home in the company of 
others watch TV, read, work, or do something other than conversation while eating.5  Not only 
 15 
has direct conversational communication been intruded upon by distractions—mostly those of 
the media—and by increased absence of household members from the table, but the meal itself 
has been becoming less homemade, as Americans rely increasingly in prepackaged foods and 
restaurants. One might think that the exceptionally high rates of divorce and single parent headed 
families in America—the highest in the industrialized world—are the cause of this trend, yet 
family fragmentation is only one factor in a broader cultural context. 
 The same survey showed that the younger the adult, the more likely he or she is to rely on 
prepackaged and take-out foods, with fully one in four 18-29 year olds eating such food on a 
typical week night, compared to 16% of 30-49 year olds and 10% of those 50 and older. Busy-
ness seems to be the key to the decline of the time invested in the meal, with both affluent 
families and those under 50 eating together and eating homemade meals less than other groups. 
Yet when one considers the vast amount of time invested in television and leisure activities by 
Americans of all classes, or how much food Americans of all classes waste, as revealed in 
archaeologist William Rathje’s studies of garbage, the findings suggest that cultural habits of 
conduct and not only simple utilitarian time and money equations are involved. The decline of 
the family meal may be one further indication of a centrifugal culture displacing and dispersing 
domestic culture in the new American hierarchy of values and not simply the result of 
expedience.  
 The ritual of the family meal—both the craft of cooking and the art of conversation—is a 
potential anchor in the maelstrom of life. Yet despite studies which have shown a regular dinner 
hour to be beneficial to marital stability and educational achievement—for example, one factor 
which National Merit Scholars shared was a daily dinner hour with their families in which the 
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day’s activities were discussed, uninterrupted—family members seem to be getting too busy to 
spend dinner time with and for each other.  
 Further signs of the double centrifugal effects of American culture upon the home can be 
seen in the rising number of meals eaten away from home over the past two decades and in the 
reduction of time spent practicing cooking in the home. Even a study by the epitome of 
mechanized food, Kraft General Foods, found that “there is no new new traditionalist trend. 
Overall, Kraft General Foods found a decline in the share of households preparing food from 
scratch.”6 
 We again see American centrifugal culture at work, hurling households out onto the 
streets in search of fast food joints and restaurants, hurling individually prepackaged foods into 
the microwave so that each family member has “freedom to choose” his or her own meal to share 
in intimacy with the TV. Nobody has to talk. Nobody has to walk. If only Walt Whitman could 
see how those “Democratic Vistas” of which he spoke have shrunk to the vanishing point. 
 The spread of the microwave oven in the 1980s—to the point where half of all 
households in America now contain microwaves—has not only cut the amount of time spent on 
cooking foods from scratch, but also radically increased the reach of prepackaged frozen and 
prepared foods into the home. This intrusion into the practice of cooking by the food industry is 
often widely regarded as a cause for celebration, a high-tech means toward those old American 
virtues of rugged individualism and freedom of choice. As a senior vice president of a marketing 
research and management-consulting firm in New York said, “Speed has truly liberated the 
woman. Mom no longer has to be head of house. Household members are more autonomous and 
providing for themselves.”  A headless household is here automatically assumed to be 
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synonymous with increased autonomy, and the possibility that speed has simply atomized the 
household is never raised. 
 The effect of these trends has been to pull apart the family meal, either by pulling it out 
of the home setting or by dissembling the family meal within the home itself. The boom of the 
fast food industry in America has transformed the evening meal from a gathering of the family in 
familiar surroundings with conversation and a personal repertoire of foods into an automobile 
drive and direct act of consumption, frequently at “fast food” factories, or, for the more well-to-
do, at “Yuppie” restaurants which spread in the 1980s, and unmediated by a personal touch—
unless putting ketchup on a hamburger or being handed a wine bottle cork a few times per week 
is regarded as an act of autonomy. There are, to be sure, increased pressures on single-parent, 
impoverished and dual career families, which speed cooking and fast food can perhaps help to 
alleviate. Yet the unavoidable questions are whether these techniques further the craft and 
communion of the meal and of family life, and how much automatism a person or family is 
willing to tolerate in the practice of life. The survey results suggest that these questions are 
virtually never asked. 
 Perhaps things were not as bleak on the home front in the past decade as I have pictured 
them. The great irony in these trends is that the 1980s were also the “nutrition decade,” when 
Americans paid more attention to the nutritional value of food, even if the practice of the evening 
meal seemed to decline. The confounding nature of American life was illustrated in the fact that 
Americans were eating healthier diets, changing to lower fat and higher fiber foods, and reducing 
the consumption of alcohol even while the meal as a social institution was becoming more 
fragmented or leaving home. Perhaps the “pluralistic meal” symbolizes postmodern autonomy, 
in which women and children share in the “isolatoism” which formerly characterized the adult 
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male sex role. Or perhaps the increased awareness of nutrition and decreased significance of the 
meal symbolizes that Americans are becoming better consumers while caring less about the 
practice of the noncommodifiable, simple things of life. Such problems certainly do highlight the 
tensions contemporary families face in trading certain forms of autonomy at the cost of others.  
 Perhaps increased concern with nutrition suggests that the ability to recover autonomous 
private lives may still exist as a latent possibility. But re-focalizing the practice of the home meal 
for contemporary families requires the re-appropriation of the art of conversation and the craft of 
cooking. In families with two working parents, this would seem to require redistributing the 
work of cook as well, which was traditionally the woman’s province.  
 Surveys do indicate that men—at least those under 50—have begun to cook more. In the 
second half of the twentieth-century in America, men exercised the “instrumental” sex role 
stereotype in the cooking realm chiefly as outdoorsmen barbecue chefs, and perhaps the 
microwave, by virtue of its status as an “instrumental” machine, allows men to cook in the 
kitchen without threatening the standard sex-role stereotype. Increased sharing of the cooking 
duties in such families would help to maintain the needed presence of feminine nurturance in the 
home, which need not be solely identified with women, and which has been strangely 
undervalued by feminists. The human presence—both food cooked with care and the engaged 
participation of family members in conversation and conviviality—has been withering in the face 
of automatic culture, as has, apparently, the family itself. But what would it take to re-focalize 
the practice of the home meal? 
From the Walled City to the Malled City 
 The question of whether contemporary American society is genuinely secular or still 
strongly religious has engendered lively discussion in recent years. This debate often avoids the 
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fact that the vast majority of both secular and denominational Americans are ardent believers in 
the cult of consumerism. The ceremony of Christmas, in which one-quarter of the annual retail 
sales take place in December alone, testifies to what Americans practice, regardless of what they 
preach. Christmas is the chief annual ritual of consumption in American society, in which 
Americans symbolically bond relationships through acts of consumption and exchange, welding 
the ancient practice of gift reciprocity to contemporary pecuniary standards.  Such acts are 
intuitively felt to be what “home” is all about. Christmas shopping also highlights the relation 
between the private sphere of the home and the public sphere in consumer society. 
 The past two decades have seen the explosive growth of shopping malls, outgrowths of 
consumer culture which have contributed to fundamental transformations of the American public 
sphere. I will briefly illustrate the centrifugal effects of shopping malls on American community 
life by focusing on South Bend, Indiana, a middle-sized city of approximately 100,000 people in 
a metropolitan area of roughly 250,000. 
 South Bend was the original proposed site of the Middletown study of Robert and Helen 
Lynd, but apparently was rejected by the private foundation which funded the study because it 
was “too ethnic” and therefore insufficiently “American.” Of course the presence of large 
immigrant communities in this middle-sized industrial city would have made it an excellent site 
for the study of early twentieth-century America—just as its loss of industry and population 
make it an excellent site to witness late twentieth-century America—but history did not happen 
that way. South Bend was home to the Studebaker company, which began manufacturing 
carriages in the nineteenth-century and cars in the twentieth-century, and which foreshadowed 
the decline of the American auto industry when it went out of business in 1964. At one point 
Studebaker employed 25,000 workers, and the loss of the plant put a great strain on the city. 
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South Bend is also home to the University of Notre Dame, the most famous American football 
university and symbolic alma mater of Ronald Reagan, who acted as the Notre Dame football 
player “the Gipper” in a well-known movie. One consequence of the general loss of industry 
throughout the Midwest was that the university had become South Bend’s largest employer by 
the end of the 1980s. In short, South Bend is an all-American city, suffering, like many other 
“rust belt” cities, from lost industries and a devitalized downtown, and seeking to redefine itself. 
 Like many middle-sized American cities today, South Bend is ringed by a few large 
shopping malls. The most recently built mall-complex is the University Park Mall, which opened 
in 1979 just outside the city limits, in Mishawaka, Indiana. In the ten short years of the 1980s it 
grew at a fantastic rate, becoming by its second year the dominant mall in the area, so that today 
it commands retail sales far in excess of the city of South Bend and of the other malls, and has 
caused severe loss of business to one of the other malls.  It has spawned a vast surrounding 
complex with virtually continuous new construction, where one can literally see the unlimited, 
unplanned growth in progress. This was vividly illustrated in an interview I conducted with the 
director of redevelopment for the city of South Bend, Ann Kolata, who told me:  
“We are getting some backlash. We hear tremendous numbers of people 
complaining about the traffic. It was not really good planning for entrances and exits. 
They basically had farm land out there, and could have controlled the way it developed, 
but it was not done... One of the major problems that exist, is that there is no overall 
community planning which crosses political boundaries. 
I walked once at Christmas time with my husband [across the major road cutting 
through the complex] and we almost got killed, crossing at the stop light on Grape Road. 
The parking lots were all jammed, and we thought it would be easier to walk than to 
move the car and find a new parking space.  We couldn’t believe how awful it was. We 
thought at the time it was so crowded that we would just park and walk across, but it was 
very inhospitable. It was not pleasant.”  
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 The traffic crossings at this complex make no concessions to pedestrians. There are 
neither pedestrian markings nor cross-walk signals, and the habits of American automobile 
culture are so deeply ingrained that there have been no public complaints either. Users of the 
mall complex know that the only reason for being in the open air is to go to or from one’s car. 
Compare this attitude with a recollection of the older South Bend given by one grandmother I 
interviewed, who said,  
 “Everyone used to go downtown then—on Saturdays or on Mondays when the stores 
would stay open late. We would walk downtown. And you would see your neighbors out too. It’s 
not like now when no one knows their neighbors.”  
 “The quality stores were downtown. The first pizza place opened up in about 1951. I 
would go with friends and just have a bite at first, but after a couple of times there I really got to 
like pizza. Niles [a neighboring town] also moved its quality stores out of town. It’s trying to 
build up the downtown now.” 
 
This South Bend of 40 years ago, though representative of its time, is quite remote from 
today’s South Bend and the contemporary American city in general, where fear of crime cautions 
against night-time walks to and from downtown, and where the idea that one would walk a mile 
or two instead of driving seems alien. 
 After the loss of the Studebaker plant, South Bend attempted to follow the lead of nearby 
Kalamazoo, Michigan, the first American city to remake its downtown on a mall plan in 1959. 
South Bend tried to create a downtown mall, in an effort to ward off competition from new malls 
around the periphery of the city but the centrifugal lure of the mall—cheap land, minimal zoning 
laws, brand new totalized shopping environments, limited access—proved to be too much 
competition for an aging downtown. Plans for a “superblock” downtown mall fell through in the 
late 1970s when Sears withdrew and relocated at the new University Park Mall. 
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 Perhaps the chief reason why malls have proven so attractive to Americans in recent 
years is that they represent ideal environments where nothing bad ever happens, where 
everything is always shiny and new, and where everybody is happily consuming. It is instructive 
to compare ideals of shopping malls with the ideal of the city.  Lewis Mumford has suggested 
that the city itself was the original utopia, concretely realized at the dawn of civilization:  
 “as Fustel de Coulanges and Bachofen pointed out a century ago, the city was primarily a 
religious phenomenon: it was the home of a god, and even the city wall points to to this super-
human origin; for Mircea Eliade is probably correct in inferring that its primary function was to 
hold chaos at bay and ward off  inimical spirits. 
 This cosmic orientation, these mythic-religious claims, this royal preempting of the 
powers and functions of the community are what transformed the mere village or town into a 
city: something ‘out of this world,’ the home of a god. Much of the contents of the city—houses, 
shrines, storage bins, ditches, irrigation works—was already in existence in smaller 
communities: but though these utilities were necessary antecedents of the city, the city itself was 
transmogrified into an ideal form—a glimpse of eternal order, a visible heaven on earth, a seat of 
life abundant—in other words, utopia.”7 
 
 The ancient city wall held “chaos at bay” and warded off “inimical spirits,” just as the 
walled Medieval city, whose success may have been the initial impetus to modern capitalism, 
warded off potential enemies. Americans seem to have activated these ancient functions of the 
wall in shopping malls, which ward off that which is “undesirable.” But where the ancient wall 
served the life of the city, the modern mall serves itself, and privatizes the life of the city into 
itself.  Americans have increasingly chosen to spend their time and money in walled malls 
instead of in cities.  The ancient gods of the city and of the home have not been dispelled by 
modern materialism, but have been reinstated in the ever-tightening cult of American 
consumerism. In this new monotheism, the organic seasons of nature have metamorphosed into 
extended indoor shopping seasons, and the ancestor cult transformed from an act of propitiation 
into a declaration of consumptive independence. 
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 Malls represent a vision of utopia in contemporary American society, promising to free 
Americans from crime, urban blight, and uncertainty. But they do this by alienating people from 
spontaneous conduct, voluntary association other than that of a consumer, and ultimately from a 
public life.  As privatized public spaces they rigidly enforce the new American code of 
controlled and monitored behavior, the “culture of control.”8 They are not only controlled, but 
also controlling environments. Malls promise that the good life is to be found in the life of 
goods, but their reality is that they are literal embodiments of the dark side of Thomas More’s 
ambiguous term “utopia,” which suggests both “eutopia”—“the good place”—and ou topos, 
literally “no place.” They give ample testimony to the benumbed confusion in America that 
capitalism and democracy are synonymous, and to the continued atrophy of vital democracy. 
 A good illustration of the antidemocratic nature of malls was given in the autumn of 1987 
when the manager of the University Park Mall opposed additional buses that would have enabled 
poor and mostly black citizens access during the busy Christmas season. Although the city bus 
company had approved a “holiday shopper shuttle service,” mall officials refused to allow the 
extra buses filled with potential consumers, because they regarded bus riders, in the words of the 
manager, as “downtowners” and “Westsiders” who are “undesirable” at the mall. What could be 
more revealing of the current predicament of American cities and civic life than the use of the 
term “downtowners” in a pejorative sense? 
 These comments were disclosed in a memo from the general manager of the bus service 
to its board, who added that the mall’s assistant manager claimed that the mall management 
would publicly deny such comments. And management, the mall developing Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corporation of Ohio, did just that, stating that the “only reason” that holiday bus 
service was rejected was “due to physical limitations of parking facilities during the holiday 
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season,” which included “extra wear and tear” on mall roadways. One would think that such 
“extra wear and tear” was why those roadways were built in the first place, to bring more 
shoppers to the mall, but apparently poor pedestrians lack the necessary credentials of 
automobile ownership. At least Scrooge, in Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, could 
honestly express his capitalistic contempt for the poor and for the spirit of Christmas giving. But 
the DeBartolo Corporation, which a year later would give some thirty-three million dollars of its 
mall-gotten gains to the University of Notre Dame for a performing arts building and classrooms, 
could not publicly state that malls are carefully designed and located to keep people out. As 
William H. Whyte has noted,  
 “Malls screen out people.  In suburban malls this is counted as an asset.  By keeping out 
undesirables, the malls’ guards provide regular customers with a more secure and pleasant 
environment. 
 A further self-screening factor is built into suburban malls.  Since access is by car, people 
who don’t have cars are less likely to go there. They may go by bus, but scheduled runs are 
infrequent. (If they do go by bus, furthermore, they may get a very small hello. At one mall in 
New Jersey, the bus waiting area provides no overhead cover and no place to sit). 
Much has been made of malls as the new town centers. They are not. Centers, perhaps, 
but not of the city. They reject many of the activities of a true center. They do not welcome—
indeed, do not tolerate—controversy, soapboxing, passing of leaflets, impromptu entertaining, 
happenings, or eccentric behavior, harmless or no.”9 
 
 It is difficult to know why tremendous amounts of money can be spent building 
unplanned, cancerous “urbanoid tissue” which pulls South Bend and many other communities’ 
civic shape apart into amorphous “no places,” while it remains next to impossible to build up a 
vital downtown, prosperous and free from crime and blight. The centrifuge of automatic culture 
seems to have as powerful a grip on civic life as it does on private life. 
 The mall is a devitalized machine, a profit machine. It embodies the old-fashioned vision 
of the city of the future as a unidimensional, timeless present—a robotic “Main Street,”while 
 25 
losing its own past in the ever-shifting displays of goods. These new American malls are vast, 
enclosed, largely depersonalized spaces lacking in place. As forms of human geography, it is 
difficult to see how such malls and inorganic mallscapes can engender what Yi-Fu Tuan has 
termed topophilia, the love of place.10  Topophilia may have been the chief motive in the original 
establishment of settled villages and cities, and in this sense the postindustrial, postmodern mall 
may well signal the advent of postcivilized, posthuman culture. 
 What is democracy? How might its physical form be different from antidemocratic 
impulses? How does it involve a genuinely public sociopolitical and cultural life?  Nazi neo-
classicism was a clear example of antidemocratic, imperial architecture.  But what does it mean 
when the citizens of South Bend willingly forego a varied landscape through which runs a river 
that would be regarded as major in Europe, in favor of a totally bland, windowless, climate-
controlled, enclosed environment reachable solely by auto or bus, a totalistic environment of 
consumption in which free speech can be regarded as trespassing?  Shopping malls across 
America are in the process of introducing a closed-circuit television network, appropriately 
named “Mall Vision,” which will feature consumer information mixed with advertising. This 
innovation, taken in combination with at-home computer shopping, represents the final melting 
of private and public spheres into the great consumption utopia.  Mall culture truly represents the 
“harmonious ant-hill where there are no dissenting voices,” as Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor 
expressed it.  
 We are building the new imperial palace in these shopping malls, and have willingly 
given up the public square on which democracy is built: only in the American version of the 
Chinese “forbidden city,” all consumers are admitted who can drive and exhibit the potential to 
purchase. The undesirables—the impoverished in particular—are not so much forcibly denied as 
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economically discouraged. As Emerson said already in the mid-nineteenth century: “Things are 
in the saddle and ride mankind.” If civilization may be said to begin with the “urban implosion” 
of the walled-city, perhaps we may see its end in the American malled city of automobiles and 
motorists, commodities and shoppers: the “city” without citizens.  
Home Again? 
 The dream of the new world, of creating a democratic civilization freed from the 
compulsive hierarchies and tyrannies of Western civilization, has given way to the quiet 
compulsions of automatic power and culture. Americans need to refocus the home and city, to 
offset those centrifugal energies which put the automaton in the place of the everyday practice of 
life. This does not mean a nostalgic retreat into an anti-technological Luddite mentality, but an 
honest and self-critical confrontation of the self with the alien culture America has become.  
 In a study I conducted of the meaning of household possessions, I found that although 
most Americans are surrounded by the material props of consumerism and conspicuous 
consumption—stereos, cars, kitchen gadgets—these things do not commonly stand out as 
significant when people are asked to describe their valued possessions.11 Instead, objects 
signifying attachment or personal values and experiences rather than status, such as inexpensive 
family photographs, seem better able to hold the meaning of one’s life. This suggests that 
carving out a personal dimension in the face of centrifugal culture remains a latent possibility. 
Yet the overwhelming presence of centrifugal techno-culture remains central to the way 
Americans shape their domestic and civic lives.  
 Although there are some signs that Americans are concerned with the increasing 
mechanization of life—for example, environmentalism, healthier diets—the outlook for a turn 
away from further moral homelessness looks rather bleak. What would cause Americans to shut 
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down the inroads of brain washing advertising, which seduces children and has helped to knock 
the stuffing out of American politics? To overthrow the great automobile dictatorship which, in 
the name of time-saving utility, silently forbids walking for useful purposes? What would make 
American families want to steal the time from work and leisure to eat and converse together, 
unmolested by TV?  How could local, walkable, shopping zones proliferate again in mall-
infested cities and suburbs? 
 What is urgently needed in American homes and community life is a resistance 
movement, which can regulate convenience culture to serve everyday human needs and human 
scale. Such a movement would resist environments that foster rote uniformity and technical self-
isolation by revaluing organic human autonomy over mindless, bodiless automatism. This means 
realizing, for example, that walking is and ought to be an integral aspect of everyday life, that 
one should find ways to “steal” walking activities away from the auto, especially practical 
walking activities which are manageable by foot, but simply more convenient by car. The 
renewal of walking might involve reshaping a suburban development to include sidewalks or a 
local grocery store. Or resisting the Power Complex could take the form of spending an entire 
evening by candlelight every now and then, with the family empowered to use its own resources 
for entertainment. Such evenings are occasionally forced on us when the electricity goes out after 
an electrical storm, and are many times enchanting. But to deliberately break the spell of 
American power culture by voluntary resistance, ah, now, there’s the rub!   
 Every fourth of July weekend, the city of South Bend celebrates an “Ethnic Food 
Festival,” and the entire downtown undergoes a ritual inversion, in which South Benders stroll at 
leisure amid a synesthesia of smells and sounds and sights. Many people ask why it could not be 
this way all the time, but as soon as the festival is over, the magic wears off and the centrifugal 
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mall habits resume. Yet the energy devoted to the festival and genuine civic enjoyment it 
produces suggest that the potential for a resistance movement is there. But it would have to 
confront the “spoiled moral environment” of automatic mass culture—both its demands for 
technical uniformity and its seeming opposite, the chaos of poverty, blight, crime—in order to 
revitalize the downtown.  
 Although planning could be instituted to refocalize the home and recenter the city, the 
signs, as I read them, are that Americans are quite content at present to surrender private and 
civic autonomy, in order to procure the conveniences of automatic culture. The great, thudding, 
monstrous, smelly machine of communism, of which Havel spoke, was, like the human machine 
which built the pyramids, based on punishment. That system is universally acknowledged as 
obsolete. Because today we have the great, smooth running, monstrous, deodorized machine of 
Americanism. As Lewis Mumford said, “Now the great improvement is that you control people 
by persuasion, by giving them a standard of consumption that no people has ever had before. 
Then, if they’re discontented, if their life seems a little hollow, you give them drugs and 
pornography.”12 And, we might add, you give them “Mall Vision.” 
 We are closer than ever before to realizing the dream of modern life, of freeing ourselves 
through technical invention from the necessities of life. But such liberation has long since 
revealed its sterile impotence: when the servile golem outgrows the master and assumes control. 
A vast, invisible Frankenstein haunts the American landscape and household, wreaking TV 
violence and soulless emptiness: “the more goods he accumulates, the deeper he sinks into 
suicidal impotence.” 
 Our time poses a great question: shall we recover autonomy or perfect the automaton? 
But nobody seems to be at home to answer. 
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